A private information retrieval (PIR) scheme allows a user to retrieve a file from a database without revealing any information on the file being requested. As of now, PIR schemes have been proposed for several kinds of storage systems, including replicated and MDS-coded data. In this paper, the problem of constructing a PIR scheme on regenerating codes is considered.
I. INTRODUCTION
Private information retrieval (PIR) allows a user to retrieve a file from a storage system without revealing what file she is interested in. The problem of constructing PIR schemes was introduced by Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz and Sudan [1] , [2] , where data was considered to be replicated on multiple servers. In the first model, it was assumed that the data is a bitstring x ∈ {0, 1} m , and the user would bound on the capacity of PIR schemes based on (n, k, d) MBR codes 1 .
In the PM-MSR setting, we construct a PIR scheme similar to the scheme in the PM-MBR setting,
where we consider d = 2k − 2 for simplicity. The PIR scheme achieves a PIR rate which is between 1 − d/n, the rate obtained by Dorkson and Ng [24] which is also the PIR capacity of an [n, d] MDS code, and 1 − k/n, the PIR capacity of an [n, k] MDS code.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Notation and definitions
For a, b ∈ F n q , we denote their inner product by a, b := n i=1 a i b i ∈ F q and their component-wise (star) product by a b := (a 1 b 1 , . . . , a n b n ) ∈ F n q . For I ⊂ [1, n], we denote by a |I the tuple obtained by restricting a to coordinates in I. The Reed-Solomon code of dimension k with distinct evaluation points x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), where x i ∈ F q , is defined by
It is well-known that for any 1 ≤ k ≤ n, the code RS k (x) is maximum-distance separable (MDS), and that RS j (x) ⊆ RS k (x) for every j ≤ k. Therefore there exists a basis Γ = {γ 1 , . . . , γ k } of RS k (x), such that, for every j ≤ k and every subset I ⊂ [1, n] for cardinality |I| ≥ j, the family Γ (I,j) := {(γ 1 ) |I , . . . , (γ j ) |I } is a basis of RS j (x |I ) ⊆ F |I| q . For instance, one can take a degree-ordered monomial basis, explicitly given by γ j := (x j 1 , . . . , x j n ) ∈ F n q . Throughout this paper, we will refer to the asymptotic PIR capacity simply as the PIR capacity, as this is the only definition of PIR capacity we consider.
The Vandermonde matrix with distinct basis elements x ∈ F n q is the n × k matrix Ψ ∈ F n×k q such that Ψ i,j = x j i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ k. We know that Ψ generates the code RS k (x) by columns. More precisely, these columns form the monomial basis we mentioned earlier.
The nomenclature used in this paper is summarized in the following table.
B. Private information retrieval
Consider a scheme between a user and n servers storing an encoded version of F files X 1 , . . . , X F . In the scheme, queries Q [1] , . . . , Q[n] are sent to servers, which in return compute responses R [1] , . . . , R [n] accordingly. Now, assume the user wants to retrieve a specific file X f0 , for 1 ≤ f 0 ≤ F . We say the 1 Regenerating codeword associated to X f , as stored on the DSS
Q -th query sent to servers R Rate of a PIR scheme
H(·)
Entropy function scheme achieves information-theoretic PIR against non-colluding servers, if the following requirements hold: Privacy:
Recovery:
Here, H(·) denoted the entropy function. Concerning the recovery constraint, it is also desirable that the user is able to reconstruct X f0 explicitly from
. Finally, we define the (download) PIR rate of a scheme by R :=
i.e., γ := βd symbols in total. Parameters of regenerating codes are sometimes shortly denoted (n, k, d), but one should take care that d is not the minimum distance of the code, and k is not the dimension of the code.
Dimakis et al. [17] proved that any storage (erasure) code must satisfy the so-called cut-set bound
and codes achieving this bound are called regenerating codes. Dimakis et al. also showed that equality in (1) defines a tradeoff between parameters α and γ = βd, which cannot be minimized simultaneously.
Optimal codes minimizing γ = βd reach the minimum-bandwidth regeneration (MBR) point, while those minimizing α attain the minimum-storage regeneration (MSR) point.
D. Product-Matrix constructions
In this work, we focus on the regenerating codes built by Rashmi et al. in [18] , through the productmatrix (PM) framework. In their constructions, the authors set β = 1 without loss of generality, since regenerating codes with β = 1 can be built by striping files in regenerating codes with β = 1. Therefore, for convenience we also consider the setting β = 1 in what follows.
1) PM codes in the MBR setting:
At the MBR point with β = 1, we have the following constraints on the parameters:
The construction of Rashmi et al. [18] can be presented as follows. Firstly, file (message) symbols are
where S is a k × k symmetric matrix containing Example 1 (Optimal PM-MBR code). Consider the setting (n, k, d) = (6, 3, 4) over the field F 7 . The
= 9 symbols. Let x = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) ∈ F 6 7 . The generator (Vandermonde) matrix and the message matrix are then given as: 
2) PM codes in the MSR setting: In the MSR setting with β = 1, parameters α and B are given by:
In [18] , the authors construct PM codes at the MSR point, for d ≥ 2k − 2. In this setting, d ≤ 2α
and B ≤ α(α + 1). In this work, for simplicity, we assume d = 2k − 2 as it is the case for the first construction given in [18] . Thus, d and B can be simplified as d = 2α and B = α(α + 1). Note that the scheme we propose further in Section IV can be easily generalized to the case where d ≥ 2k − 2. file symbols. Let Ψ be an n × 2α
Vandermonde matrix over F q . As in the MBR setting, the j-th row of a codeword from the code C := ΨM is stored on server S j , for j = 1, . . . , n.
This construction is referred to as PM-MSR codes. Let us also rewrite the example given in [18, Sec.
V.A.].
Example 2 (Optimal PM-MSR code). Consider the setting (n, k, d) = (6, 3, 4) over F 13 , which gives the file size B = 6. Let x = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) ∈ F 6 13 . Matrices Ψ and M are then given by: In this section, we consider a PM-MBR code C over F q , with parameters (n, k, d). Recall that C is also a linear code over F q of length nd and dimension
A. System setup
We consider a database X composed of F files X 1 , . . . , X F , such that each X f consists of B =
information symbols. For every 1 ≤ f ≤ F , the symbols of file X f are subdivided into S ≥ 1 stripes (or subdivisions) and organized in a 3-dimensional array M f (that we abusively name a matrix), such that
where for every i, j, s, f , we have
must the form given in (2) . Also notice that, by construction of the regenerating code C, for all i, j, s, f ,
we have:
We also use the notation M := (M 1 , . . . , M F ).
where we recall that Γ = {γ 1 , . . . , γ d } denotes a suitable basis for sequences of Reed-Solomon codes (see Section II-A). Due to the form of message matrices M f , one can also remark that
B. Intuition
The idea behind the constructed PIR scheme is to use the symmetric property of matrices M f as a way to reuse information in order to decrease the download complexity of the scheme. We note that the servers are assumed not to collude. In this scheme, each file is divided into S = n − k stripes. The user generates a set of k queries to the servers, similarly to the scheme in [13] . A query is defined as an n × S × F vector that is sent by the user to retrieve information. Randomness is embedded in the queries as a way to hide the requested file's identity, in a similar manner to one-time padding. Naturally, if privacy were not a concern, a query to retrieve file X f0 would be the vector of size n × S × F with zeroes everywhere, except in positions f = f 0 corresponding to the requested file.
The queries are then sent to the servers which project queries on their stored data the following manner.
For the last d − k columns, since each of these columns stores file stripes encoded using an [n, k] MDS code, servers are asked to project all the queries on the data they hold, similarly to [13] . For each of the other columns, stripes contain information already retrieved from the previously used columns, due to the nature of the product-matrix construction. Thus, from server S d down to server S 1 , servers are asked to project on their stored data a decreasing subset of the initial set of queries. This still enables the user to reconstruct the requested file, due to the fact that she had peeled off some randomness and information symbols from previous columns. Moreover, it allows her to run a more efficient PIR scheme on an [n, k ] MDS code with where k < k. More details are given in the upcoming sections.
C. The PIR scheme
In this section, we describe the PIR scheme explicitly. Let us assume that the user wants to retrieve a file X f0 , for some 1 ≤ f 0 ≤ F . We fix the number of stripes to S = n − k, and we consider a k-tuple of queries Q = (Q 1 , . . . , Q k ), such that for 1 ≤ ≤ k, query Q has the following form:
Notice that, since the same set of queries is meant to be used for every column, query Q does not
This property is fundamental for the privacy of the scheme.
server S i with respect to the pair ( , j), is then defined as:
We also denote by
The random tuple of queries Q is defined as the sum of two components. 1) A random part D, defined as follows. For every , s, f , a symbol λ ,s,f ∈ F q is picked uniformly at random and independently of others. Then, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we define:
In other words, D f [·, s] ∈ F n q is a word picked uniformly at random in the repetition code of length n.
2) A deterministic part E (f0) , also called the retrieval pattern. This pattern is defined by:
Finally, the tuple of queries Q is defined by Q := D + E (f0) . Notice here that each query is sent to the servers by hiding the deterministic part with a random vector. Therefore, the privacy of the scheme still holds.
Server responses to queries. We now assume that Q[i, ·] is sent to server S i , for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
In the proposed protocol, the set of responses required by the user depend on the index j ∈ [1, d] of the column, as described below:
send back to the user the responses
• For columns 1 ≤ j ≤ k, only servers S i such that k − j + 1 ≤ i ≤ n are required to respond to the user. Those servers S i must compute and send the subset of responses
We here emphasize that, for these first columns 1 ≤ j ≤ k, the subset of servers
send the subset of responses R [i, j], ∈ [1, j] to the user. This is a key point in order to achieve a good PIR rate -see Example 3 for an illustration.
Reconstruction of X f0 . The recovery is run columnwise, from column d down to column 1. For each
along with some random vectors.
• For k + 1 ≤ j ≤ d. A precise description of the recovery algorithm is given in the proof of Lemma 1. In short, it consists of running, independently on each column C[·, j, ·], the reconstruction of the PIR scheme over an MDS code described in [13] . Indeed, each C[·, j, ·] can be viewed as a smaller database encoded and stored in an [n, k] MDS storage system. This procedure allows the user to recover M f0 [·, j, ·], but one should notice that she can also collect random vectors
• For 1 ≤ j ≤ k. At step j, we can assume that for every j ≥ j + 1, the user has already collected 
and every 1 ≤ ≤ j. The retrieval process described in the proof of Lemma 2 then ensures that the
We start by giving a simple example before diving into technical proofs.
Example 3. We use the (6, 3, 4) PM-MBR regenerating code described in Example 1. For this purpose, the files are divided into S = n − k = 3 stripes, and the user sends k = 3 query vectors:
Server S 4 u + e f0,1 v + e f0,2 w + e f0,3
Server S 5 u + e f0,2 v + e f0,3 w + e f0,1
Server S 6 u + e f0,3 v + e f0,1 w + e f0,2
where e f0,s0 ∈ F F ×S q is the deterministic vector with all zeros, but one 1 in position (f 0 , s 0 ), which corresponds to stripe s 0 of what is stored from file X f0 . Vectors u, v, w ∈ F F ×S q are uniformly random vectors.
The servers project the data stored in columns 3 and 4 on all the queries. Server S 1 does not respond to any other queries. Servers S 2 , . . . , S 6 project only the first 2 queries on the data stored in their second column. Server S 2 does not respond to any other queries. Servers S 3 , . . . , S 6 project only the first query on the data stored in column 1. Then the servers send this information back to the user.
• Decodability: In this example d − k = 1. For the last row, the user receives the responses from all three queries from all six servers. The storage code for the last row is a [6, 3] MDS code. If we look at the responses to the first query from the last column, it will be:
From the above table, we can see that the user can recover the three random symbols
along with the three required symbols
Following the same reasoning, from the second and third queries the user can retrieve the random symbols
along with the required symbols,
Notice that the PIR scheme run over the fourth column achieves a PIR rate of 3/6.
For the third column, the storage code is a 
and 
Thus, the user does not need the response from server S 1 in order to decode the symbols. It means that the code can be assumed to be reduced to a • Privacy: Privacy follows from the fact that for any fixed desired file, every server gets a uniform random vector as a query.
D. Analysis
We next prove the correctness of the PIR scheme proposed in previous section.
, the following is determined:
• the piece M f0 [·, j, ·] of the desired file;
Proof. Let us fix 1 ≤ ≤ k. After receiving responses from servers, the user is able to build the response
Notice that we have
We can now define
and we see that
where
and therefore has weight at most n − k.
Now, denote by
Since every D f [·, s] belongs to the repetition code and 
allows the user to retrieve a subset of k distinct symbols of C f0 [·, j, s], which is equivalent to retrieving
Lemma 2. Let 1 ≤ j ≤ k. For every 1 ≤ ≤ j, for convenience we denote by
the following are determined:
Proof. Let us fix 1 ≤ ≤ j. In contrast with Lemma 1, we will deal with vectors of shorter length n − k + j. In particular, we denote x = (x k−j+1 , . . . , x n ). Similarly, the user is able to build the response vector R [·, j] of length n − k + j given by as follows:
Therefore, using vectors in (4) the user can build
Hence, she is able to construct
As the basis {γ 1 , . . . , γ d } is ordered by degree, we see that
Indeed, each {γ 1 , . . . γ j } must also be a basis of smaller RS codes. Also remark that once again, the Theorem 1. The scheme proposed in Section III-C is secure against non-colluding servers. Its PIR rate is:
Proof. Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 ensure that the user retrieves the correct file X f0 as long as the servers S 1 , . . . , S n follow the protocol described in Section III-C. Since the servers are assumed not to collude, the only way a server S i can learn information about the identity f 0 of the required file, is from its own query matrix Q[i, ·]. Since the matrix Q[i, ·] is chosen such that it is statistically independent of f 0 , the scheme is private. More precisely, since
where H(·) denotes the entropy function.
Let us now compute the PIR rate. The file X f0 consists of
symbols over F q . During step j, for k + 1 ≤ j ≤ d, the user downloads k responses from each server S 1 , . . . , S n . Hence she gets a total of nk(d − k) symbols for all these steps. For columns 1 ≤ j ≤ k, the user downloads j responses from servers S k−j+1 , . . . , S n , leading to a total of k j=1 j(n − k + j) symbols for those steps. Therefore, we get the following PIR rate:
Remark 1. As a function of n, k, B, the PIR rate given in Theorem 1 can be written as
Indeed, starting from Equation (5) we get
, leading to the expected expression.
E. On the PIR rate 1) Comparison with the multi-file PIR scheme of Dorkson and Ng: Dorkson and Ng in [24] proposed a PIR scheme over PM-MBR codes in the context of multi-file retrieval, i.e. any set of p ≥ 1 files X f0 , . . . , X fp−1 can be simultaneously retrieved privately. In the current work, retrieving p files remains possible by iterating the 1-file PIR protocol p times. Notice that this routine achieves the same PIR rate as the 1-file PIR scheme.
In the general case, the PIR rate obtained in [24] is R = pB dn , under the additional constraint that n = pk + d. We notice that R can be reformulated as follows:
Assume that k ≤ d < n, which is the case for non-degenerate PM-MBR codes. This implies that
kd < 1, and therefore
where R MBR is the PIR rate of the scheme we propose in the current work. We emphasize our improvement upon [24] with the numerical and asymptotic analyses proposed in Figure 2 . 
PIR rate
Scheme in Sec. III-C Scheme in [24] (a) PIR rate of both schemes, with a finite number of nodes n.
We here set n = 40 and k = 7, and we plot the PIR rate versus Comparison between PIR rates of the multi-file PIR scheme in [24] and the PIR scheme in the present paper.
2) Comparison with the asymptotic capacities of scalar MDS codes: Since PM-MBR codes allow to retrieve files by contacting only k nodes among n, it is somewhat relevant to compare the proposed scheme with PIR schemes over [n, k] MDS-coded data. We can also motivate this comparison by the following example.
Example 4. In the PIR scheme presented in Example 3, the queried file has size (n − k)B = 27, while the user needs to download 18 + 18 + 10 + 4 = 50 symbols. Hence, the PIR rate is 27/50, which is [14] . In the current example, the conjectured capacity is then 1/2, which is again below the achieved rate.
Lemma 3. The PIR rate R MBR of the scheme from Theorem 1 satisfies:
Using this trivial observation in Equation (5), we get
The right-hand-side inequality is a bit more technical to state. Using the expression of R MBR given in Theorem 1, it is equivalent to prove that
is non-negative. A computation shows that:
for non-degenerated MBR codes.
If d ≥ k + 1, as it is for a non-trivial regenerating code, then we get
We can also model the n servers storing α = d symbols each as an nd-tuple of "virtual" or "sub"- A comparison of the rate of the PIR scheme constructed in this paper with the other relevant capacity expressions of PIR schemes discussed in this section is shown in Figure 3 for different values of n, k and d. We can see that the achieved rate in our scheme is higher than the PIR capacity of an [n, k]
MDS code, and for a reasonably high value of d, the achievable PIR rate for the scheme described in Section III-C. As explained before, the achieved rate is always lower than the PIR capacity of an [nd, B]
MDS code.
IV. A PIR SCHEME IN THE MSR SETTING
We consider a regenerating code C attaining the MSR point. As explained in Section II-D2, we restrict our work on the setting d = 2k − 2 = 2α for simplicity. Hence C is also a linear code over F q of length nd = 2nα and dimension B = α(α + 1).
A. System setup
Similarly to the MBR setting, we consider a storage system X of F files X 1 , . . . , X F , each storing B = α(α+1) information symbols. The symbols of the file X f , 1 ≤ f ≤ F , are arranged into S = n−2α stripes, such that the message M f can be written
By construction of the MSR code C, for all 1 ≤ f ≤ F and all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ α, we have
Moreover, for every j, s, f , the column
where we recall that {γ 1 , . . . , γ 2α } denotes a suitable basis for sequences of Reed-Solomon codes (see Section II-A).
B. The PIR scheme
Assume the user wants to retrieve file X f0 privately. We consider a 2α-tuple of queries Q = (Q 1 , . . . , Q 2α )
having the following form for 1 ≤ ≤ 2α:
Once again, Q does not depend on the column index j ∈ [1, α], preventing to leak information on the requested file.
Generation of Q. Similar to the MBR setting, queries Q are defined by Q := D + E (f0) with D and E (f0) defined as follows.
1) For every , s, f , the random vector D f [·, s] ∈ F n q is a word picked uniformly at random from the repetition code of length n.
2) The retrieval pattern E (f0) is defined by
Server responses to queries. Given a column 1 ≤ j ≤ α, only servers S i such that 2α−2j +1 ≤ i ≤ n are required to send the subset of responses R [i, j], for 1 ≤ ≤ 2j.
Reconstruction of X f0 . The recovery is run columnwise, from column α down to 1. In every step is identical to that of the first columns of the MBR case. Column α is retrieved using a classical PIR protocol on MDS codes, as in [13] . Here, the underlying storage code is RS 2α (x). Similarly to the MBR case, the user retrieves pieces of the required file, along with some randomness. The collected symbols from column α (randomness and information symbols) can be reused in column α − 1 to again retrieve other pieces of the required file and associated randomness. This process is then repeated until retrieving the information from column 1. This iterative process reduces the number of total downloaded symbols to retrieve the required file X f0 , and consequently reduces the PIR rate. We refer to Lemma 5 for technical details.
We give a simple example to explain the scheme.
Example 5. We use the (6, 3, 4) PM-MSR regenerating code presented in Example 2, with α = 2. Files are divided into S = n − 2α = 2 stripes, and the user sends 2α = 4 vectors of queries:
Query 1 Query 2 Query 3 Query 4
Server S 4 u v w + e f0,2 y + e f0,1
Server S 5 u + e f0,1 v + e f0,2 w y Server S 6 u + e f0,2 v + e f0,1 w y
The vector e f0,s0 ∈ F The servers project the data stored in column 2 on all the queries. Servers S 1 and S 2 do not respond to any other queries. Servers S 3 , . . . , S 6 project only the first 2 queries on the data stored in the first column.
C. Proofs
For 1 ≤ j ≤ α, we define the 2j-dimensional code
Lemma 4. There exists a sequence I 1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ I α ⊂ [1, n] such that, for every 1 ≤ j ≤ α, I j is an information set for the code C j .
Proof. We prove the result inductively. First notice that C α = RS 2α (x), hence one can choose any 2α-subset for I α . Then, it is sufficient to notice that for every 2 ≤ j ≤ α, we have C j−1 ⊂ C j . Hence, an information set I j for C j contains an information set for C j−1 .
The previous lemma allows us to make the following assumption: after reordering the servers (i.e. the evaluation points x), we can assume that I j = [2α − 2j + 1, 2α] for every 1 ≤ j ≤ α. Moreover, we define the code A j ⊆ F n−2α+2j q as the puncturing of C j on its (2α − 2j) first coordinates. The code A j has length n − 2α + 2j and dimension 2j, and by the chosen order of coordinates, its 2j first coordinates form an information set.
the following is determined:
• the random as follows:
Therefore, using random vectors given in (7), the vector
can be constructed by the user. Recall that for any file X f ,
for every 1 ≤ r ≤ α. Hence, the user is able to construct
and, by definition of J Proof. We have seen in Lemma 5 that the proposed scheme reconstructs the correct file. Similarly to the MBR case, the scheme is private if servers do not collude. Let us compute the PIR rate.
The desired file consists of (n − 2α)B = α(α + 1)(n − 2α) symbols. For column 1 ≤ j ≤ α, the number of downloaded symbols is 2j × (n − 2α + 2j). Hence the PIR rate of the scheme is given by 
D. On the PIR rate in the MSR case
In our simplified setting, it must hold that α = d/2 = k − 1. The PIR rate of the proposed scheme is then R MSR = 1 − 4α + 2 3n − 2α + 2 .
Dorkson and Ng [24] give a multi-file PIR scheme for the same MSR codes, with a PIR rate of α(n−d) αn = 1 − d/n. We prove in the following lemma that the PIR rate of our construction improves upon this rate.
Lemma 6. Let 1 ≤ α ≤ n/2 and assume that n ≥ 6 or α ≥ 3. Then:
Proof. For the left-hand side inequality, we need to prove that d/n ≥ (2d + 2)(3n − 2d + 2). A simple computation shows it is equivalent to (d − 2)(n − d) ≥ 0, which holds as long as α = d/2 ≥ 1.
Similarly, the right-hand side inequality R MSR ≤ 1− 
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we construct PIR schemes for the product matrix constructions in the MBR and MSR settings. The schemes use the symmetric properties of the PM codes in order to increase the PIR rate.
For the PM-MBR setting, we achieve a PIR rate that is better than 1 − k/n, i.e., larger than the PIR capacity of an [n, k] MDS coded storage system. As for the PM-MSR setting, we achieve a PIR rate between 1 − d/n, i.e., the PIR capacity of an [n, d] MDS code, and 1 − k/n.
A possible further work on the topic would be to consider colluding servers. A natural idea is to adapt the constructions of Freij-Hollanti et al. [14] , [16] , 
